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A. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The State is still not in compliance and has yet to end its
ongoing violation of the Article 9, § 1 rights of Washington’s 1.1.
million public school children.  If this Court were to relinquish
jurisdiction based on the State’s promises that it will ultimately
comply with those duties, this Court would violate not only its
Article 4 responsibilities but also its independent duties to our
state’s children under Article 9, § 1. 
B. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus curiae Washington’s Paramount Duty (WPD) is a
grassroots, non-profit advocacy organization with a single mission:
to compel Washington to amply fund basic education.  This Court
has previously granted WPD’s motions to file amicus briefing in this
case.  A similar motion is filed herewith.
C. ARGUMENT
1. THERE IS ALREADY EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE’S
NEW FUNDING SCHEME FALLS FAR SHORT OF
RESOLVING THE STATE’S ONGOING VIOLATIONS
OF THE ARTICLE 9, § 1, RIGHTS OF OUR STATE’S
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHILDREN  
This Court has already defined much of what was required
under the “Paramount Duty” clause.  The Constitution requires the
1
State, as its paramount duty, to amply fund basic education for every
child in Washington State from regular and dependable tax sources.
McCleary v. Washington, 173 Wn.2d 477, 484-485, 520, 527, 532, 546,
269 P.3d 227 (2012).  “Paramount” means “more important than all
other things concerned.”  Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, 90
Wn.2d 476, 510-13, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).  As used in Article 9, § 1, the
word “ample” “provides a broad constitutional guideline meaning
fully, sufficient, and considerably more than just adequate.” 
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 483-84.  
The State is now claiming it has satisfied its Paramount Duty
under Article 9, § 1.  Yet even the minimal evidence available shows
that is not the case.    
In 2007-2008 school year, Washington spent $9980 per
student; the national average was $10,615; the highest spending states
spent nearly twice that.  Seattle School Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 511.  No
state, other than Washington, constitutionally promises that amply
funding public education is the paramount duty of the state; thus
Washington’s “Paramount Duty” clause is the strongest such clause
in the country.  Id.  
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In April of 2018, our state’s Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Chris Reykdal, explained that even with the State’s new
investments in public schools, Washington is still in the bottom half
of the country when it comes to school funding.  He declared,
“[e]ven as the Legislature has added new resources to shore up ‘basic’
education, we are still a state that invests less in our schools than the
national average[.]”  Office for Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Reykdal Asks Public to Help Develop K-12 Education Budget, Apr. 25,
2018, available at
http://www.k12.wa.us/Communications/PressReleases2018/Develop
Budget.aspx. Indeed, Superintendent Reykdal also indicated that
current investments are insufficient to “increase student
achievement.”  Id.  Thus, Washington’s strong constitutional promise
to every child, over a decade of litigation and appellate review of this
case, and the Legislature’s increased investment in public schools
(after slashing the K-12 education budget during the recession) has
not even secured Washington as spot as a state which spends at least
the national average on basic education.
In addition, the State will still be relying on local levy funds to
be used, in at least part, to support funding of the basic education
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program.  This Court explained in its 2012 ruling that: “Reliance on
levy funding to finance basic education was unconstitutional 30
years ago in Seattle School District, and it is unconstitutional now.” 
McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539; see also Nov. 15, 2017 Order at 11
(reiterating that this Court held the feature of the former funding
system to rely upon local funding sources to pay for basic education
to be unconstitutional).  
The State agrees in its brief with the requirement that the
State, and not local school districts through its local levies, must
provide ample funding for basic education.  State’s April 9, 2018 Br.
at 5 (“[T]he State must fully fund its basic education program with
state revenues.  The State cannot rely on local levies to support the
basic education program”).
But in fact, reliance on local levies is still required in order for
school districts to meet the minimum funding required for basic
education.  Special education is included as part of the State’s
definition of basic education.  RCW 28A.150.220(3)(f) (“The
instructional program of basic education provided by each school
district shall include: . . . The opportunity for an appropriate
education at public expense . . . for all eligible students with
4
disabilities . . . .”); see also, McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 506 (“[T]he
[ESHB 2261] legislation preserved the historically recognized basic
education offerings: remediation, transitional bilingual education,
and special education.”); Nov. 15, 2017 Order (“The legislation
retained the historically recognized basic education components of
remediation (through the Learning Assistance Program (LAP)), a
transitional bilingual instructional program (TBIP), and special
education”).
Although the State must amply fund basic education,
including special education, through regular and dependable State
funding, the Superintendent of Public Instruction recently informed
school districts that they may continue to use local property tax
levies to pay for special education, because of the continuing lack of
full funding for that basic education program.  Jerry Cornfield, The
Everett Herald, Public School Funding Issue Far from Being Settled,
Sept. 3, 2017, available at https://www.heraldnet.com/news/public-
school-funding-issue-far-from-being-settled/.  Superintendent
Reykdal argued that allowing school districts to continue using local
property tax levies to pay for special education is “the only way to
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ensure districts can comply with federal requirements governing
special education.”  Id.  
Indeed, Mr. Reykdal wrote to school superintendents: “You
are stuck in an almost impossible situation[.] . . . I/we cannot forsake
federal law in an attempt to meet state law.  Where you clearly make
the case that you have no reasonable choice but to use local levy
proceeds, I will approve those levy plans.”  Id.  And in an interview
Superintendent Reykdal frankly declared:
I have consistently said none of the (legislative) scenarios will
satisfy the needs for special education funding.  If a district
comes to me and says they need local levy dollars for special
education, I am going to allow that[.] . . . We will always put
civil rights ahead of legislative funding caps.
Id.  
Thus, the legislature’s “full funding” scheme is far from what
it purports to be.  If it truly met the requirements of Article 9, § 1,
then Superintendent Reykdal would not have to declare that he
would allow local school districts to use their levies to fund special
education in order to meet even the minimal federal requirements
for special education—let alone the Article 9, § 1 requirements that it
be funded “amply” in our state.  
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Earlier in this case, however, this Court held that relying on
local levy funding to pay for basic education is a violation of the
State’s constitutional duties under Article 9, § 1.  See McCleary, 173
Wn.2d at 539.  It is thus already evident that the State’s untested
claims that its current funding scheme meets the requirements of
Article 9, § 1, are at best overly optimistic.  
Moreover, the State’s deadline for implementing the rules and
procedures regarding the special education State safety net is out of
compliance with its own September 1, 2018 deadline.  This Court
relied on and upheld the Legislature’s promise that it would meet
that deadline to implement ample funding.  See Nov. 15, 2017 Order
at 41 (“[t]he court in its order on October 6, 2016 was clear: ‘the State
has until September 1, 2018, to fully implement its program of basic
education.”) (citing Oct. 6, 2017 Order) (emphasis in Nov. 15, 2017
Order).   Indeed, this Court has said, “[t]hat deadline, representing
the start of the 2018-19 school year, is firm.”  Nov. 15, 2017 Order at
41-42. 
This Court has already found that (as of November 15, 2017)
the terms of the basic education salary structure funding to school
districts would not be fully implemented by September 1, 2018.  Id. at
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42.  Because the State allocation model would not be implemented
by September 1, 2018, this Court ruled that the State was “out of full
compliance with its constitutional duty under article IX, section 1.” 
Id. at 43.
The State is still currently similarly out of compliance
regarding special education funding.  The State relies on the safety
net “to supplement special education allocations for districts that are
able to demonstrate additional need.”  State’s April 9, 2018 Report at
18 (citing RCW 28.150.392).  
However, the State set the deadline for the rules and
procedures to administer the special education safety net and award
process as December 1, 2018.  Engrossed Second Substitute Senate
Bill 6362 (E2SSB 6362), Laws of 2018 (K-12 policy and funding
legislation), amending RCW 28A.150.392; see also State’s April 9, 2018
Report at 19.  This December 1, 2018 deadline—for the rules and
procedures, and not the awarding of grants themselves—is two
months after the September 1, 2018, deadline, when school districts
commence the 2018-2019 school year.  While the adjusted December
1, 2018 deadline for the rules and policies on the special education
safety net and award process is earlier than the September 1, 2019
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deadline the State set in 2017, the fact is that the State fails to meet
the September 1, 2018 deadline.  
Just as the State was out of compliance by attempting to delay
the State allocation salary model to after September 1, 2018, the State
is currently out of constitutional compliance by relying upon the
special education safety net and delaying the new rules and
procedures to December 1, 2018—two months after the September 1,
2018 deadline.   
2. THIS COURT’S INDEPENDENT DUTIES UNDER
ARTICLE 9, § 1 EXCEED ITS ARTICLE 4 DUTIES AND
SUPPORT CONTINUING JURISDICTION AND
OVERSIGHT
Once again, the State suggests that this Court should
abandon its role in this proceeding, end jurisdiction and trust that
the state will comply with its Paramount Duty.  State’s April 9, 2018
Br. at 6.  This Court should reject the state’s invitation to abandon
both the Court’s Article 4 and Article 9, § 1 duties.  Instead, those
duties require the Court to  continue its oversight until the State
finally remedies its ongoing violations of the constitutional
education rights of this state’s public school children.    
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This state has no formal “separation of powers” clause and
instead implies the doctrine because it is presumed to have been
intended, based on the division of the government into three
branches.  Brown v. Owen, 165 Wn.2d 706, 718, 206 P.3d 310 (2009).  
Our doctrine, however, differs from many others in which the
separate branches are “hermetically sealed” from engaging in related
tasks.  Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No.49,  169 Wn.2d 494, 503-504,
198 P.3d 102 (2009).  
In our state, only the “fundamental functions of each branch”
are kept unique and separate, but shared duties are handled, at least
in theory, with “harmonious cooperation” in order to serve the best
interest of the people.  See Zylstra v. Piya, 85 Wn.2d 743, 750, 539
P.2d 823 (1975).  Thus, for example, because both legislative and
judicial branches have some authority over rules of evidence, the
Court will try to “harmonize” conflicting statutes and court rules. 
See City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wn.2d 384, 394, 143 P.3d 776 (2006),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1254 (2007).
In exercising its Article 4 duties, this Court has long applied
relatively extreme deference to the Legislature.  See, e.g., City of
Bothell v. Barnhart, 172 wn.2d 223, 229, 257 P.3d 648 (2011) (noting
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the Court’s use of a presumption that all legislative acts are
constitutional); Robb v. City of Tacoma, 175 Wn. 580, 586, 28 P.327
(1933) (Court stating it is not part of its role to review or “revise”
legislative action “but rather to enforce the legislative will when
acting within its constitutional limits”).  Despite this historic
deference, however, this Court has rejected the idea that the benefit
of the “separation of powers” doctrine is to protect the branches of
government.  Hale, 169 Wn.2d at 503-504.  
Instead, this Court has found, the purpose of our state’s
“separation of powers” doctrine is to protect the citizens—“to ensure
liberty by defusing and limiting power.”  Id.  The delegates to the
1889 Constitutional Convention included farmers, merchants,
bankers, and other citizens who were well aware of the government
corruption in the Washington Territory, primarily by the Territorial
Legislature.  Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental
Principles: Individual Rights, Free Government, and the Washington
State Constitution, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 669, 669-70 (1992).  Delegates
were “familiar with the history of school funds” in other states “and
the attempt was made to avoid the possibility of repeating “the tale
of dissipation and utter loss.”  Theodore L. Stiles, The Constitution of
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the State and its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 WASH. HISTORICAL Q.
281, 284 (1913).
Indeed, interviews with delegates to the Convention revealed
a fear of government “tyranny” focused mostly on the legislative
branch, so that it was reported that the halls at the convention
echoed with delegates expressing a willingness “to trust the people
but not the Legislature.”  Snure, at 672, citing, The Journal of the
Wash. State Const. Convention 1889 (Beverly Rosenow ed., 1962), at
58, 66.
This history is important because it was in this context that
the delegates wrote the Paramount Duty clause.  See Lebbeus J.
Knapp, The Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4
Wash. Hist. Q. 227, 228 (1913); see also Francis N. Thorpe, Recent
Constitution Making in the United States, 2 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 145, 160 (1891).  And in choosing the language for the clause,
as this Court has noted, the framers decided to make all three
branches responsible for meeting the Paramount Duty - not just the
Legislature alone.  Seattle School District, 90 Wn.2d at 510-13. 
Thus, the framers specifically chose to impose a duty upon
this Court which exceeds its normal duties under Article 4.  Article 4
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charges the judiciary with the duty of interpreting and giving
meaning to the constitution and serving as its final arbiter.  See In re
Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 241, 552 P.2d 163 (1987).  This Court
has rejected the state’s arguments that, despite Article 4, it is “the
sole prerogative of the Legislature to interpret, construe and give . . .
substantive content” to the Paramount Duty clause.  Seattle School
Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 503.  And the Court has held that it is tasked with
not only its Article 4 duties but also its independent duties under
Article 9, §1, to the children whose rights are involved.  Id. 
Moreover, this Court has recognized the importance of 
retaining jurisdiction as a part of its constitutionally mandated role
in this case, declaring that by retaining jurisdiction, it is
fulfilling its constitutional obligation as a member of the
judicial branch of the state to determine whether the
legislative branch, which controls the State’s purse strings, is
complying with its positive constitutional duty to make ample
provision for the basic education of all children in the state; it
must order compliance if it finds the legislature is falling
short.   
Nov. 15, 2017 Order at 21. 
Once again, in this case, this Court is being asked to withdraw
its oversight of whether the Legislature has finally remedied the
ongoing violation of the Article 9, § 1 rights of the public school
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children in this state.  State’s April 9, 2018 Br. at 6.  This is not the
first time the State has urged the Court to trust that it will ultimately
comply.  See, e.g., State’s May 18, 2016 Br. at 20-21.  Nor is it even the
first time that State has asked the Court to effectively “back off” and
defer to the legislative branch completely.  Id. at 14-16.  That history
should inform this Court’s decision and inspire skepticism of the
ability of the State to comply.
In addition, it is not the first time this Court has been faced
with the question of the scope of its own duties to the now more
than 1.1 million public school students who are guaranteed rights
under Article 9, § 1.  Seattle School Dist. 90 Wn.2d at 503; Office of
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Reykdal Celebrates First Year
in Office; Looks Toward Future, Jan. 11, 2018, available at
http://www.k12.wa.us/Communications/pressreleases2018/FirstYear.
aspx.  This Court has already established that those children have a
“true” and “absolute” right to receive an “amply” funded education
which is “substantive and enforceable” by this Court.  Brown v. State,
155 Wn. 2d 254, 258, 119 P.3d 341 (2005).   It has also recognized that
Article 9, § 1, is a reflection of our state’s unique commitment to
14
education,  because “[n]o other state has placed the common school
on so high a pedestal.”  Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d at 498. 
Judge Erlick ruled, in 2010, that the state was in violation of its 
constitutional duty to fund public education and thus in ongoing
violation of the constitutional rights of the public school children of
this state.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 513.  That factual finding has been
upheld by this Court.  McCleary, 173 Wn.2d at 539.  This Court kept
jurisdiction - despite urges for it to “step back” - in recognition of its
own independent duties under Article 4 and 9, § 1.  Dismissing its
oversight at this point in the case would run afoul of those ongoing
duties, and this Court should so hold.
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D. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court has the power,
authority, and duty to continue jurisdiction, enforce its orders and
require the State to fulfill its constitutional duty to the more than
one million children in this state’s public schools.  Despite the State’s
continued claims to the contrary, deferring to the Legislature in this
matter would be an abdication of the Court’s duties and
constitutional role.  
DATED this 30th day of April, 2018.
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